No job-board passwords, anywhere
You sign in yourself and the work happens inside that session. There is no credential store for SEEK to breach, because there is nothing in it.
Most of the security posture here is architectural rather than operational: the product is built so that the most valuable thing an attacker could want is not in it.
You sign in yourself and the work happens inside that session. There is no credential store for SEEK to breach, because there is nothing in it.
Résumés, cover letters and profile images are encrypted with AES-256-GCM before they are uploaded, so the storage layer never holds a readable copy of them. All traffic is TLS. Payment card details never reach our systems at all — they go directly to the payment processor.
A run is leased, and the lease is fenced: an old worker that wakes up after losing its lease cannot act. This is a data-integrity control as much as a security one — it is what stops two machines submitting the same application.
The platform runs on a private cluster with network policy enforcement, runtime security monitoring, vulnerability scanning and policy admission control, with logs and metrics retained under a defined retention policy.
Each of these is a breach that cannot happen here, because the data is not present.
The database volume is not encrypted at rest. Documents are — they are encrypted by the application before they are stored — but the database holding your profile, your applications and the answers you gave employers sits on an unencrypted filesystem, as does the object store underneath the encrypted documents. Disk-level encryption of both is outstanding work, not a decision we have made against.
No independent penetration test has been completed. No SOC 2 or ISO 27001 certification exists, and we are not going to imply one with a badge. A formal vulnerability disclosure process is being written; until it is published, security reports should go through the contact page and will be acknowledged.
Listing these is not a disclaimer. Anyone evaluating a product like this seriously will ask, and a security page that answers only with its strengths is the least trustworthy document a company publishes.
It says what we hold, why, and who else sees it — in specifics rather than in template language.